There is Some Truth in That

Sanford Goldberg has an interesting new argument against mentalist internalism about justification in Analysis. I’m working on committing myself to an internalist approach to justification at the moment; Goldberg’s new paper isn’t enough to force me to reconsider. The master argument of the paper, which Goldberg lays out quite succinctly, is this, which I quote: [...]

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Knowledge shows up in theories a lot lately. Or should I say that ‘knowledge’ shows up in statements of theories? One question I’m hoping to research a fair amount in the near future concerns the status of theoretical claims about knowledge. The knowledge first program, broadly construed, says that knowledge has some kind of priority [...]

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I’ve been sitting in on, and enjoying, Carrie Jenkins’s grad seminar in epistemology. Today, one of our grad students, Kousaku Yui, brought up a pretty interesting suggestion in response to Jason Stanley’s stakes-relative approach to knowledge. I didn’t recognize the point as one that I’ve seen discussed before — if there is a literature on it, [...]

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I’m re-reading Timothy Williamson’s Knowledge and Its Limits for a reading group at UBC. I’m struck by this passage, from the introduction to Chapter 9 on Evidence. [W]e may speculate that standard accounts of justification have failed to deal convincingly with the traditional problem the regress of justifications—what justifies the justifiers?—because they have forbidden themselves to [...]

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I haven’t been updating my blog since moving to UBC last fall, partly because I’ve been busy preparing new courses and grant applications and settling into a new city. (My two biggest professional bits of news over the last while, for anyone interested who hasn’t already heard elsewhere, are that The Rules of Thought, my book [...]

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