Comments for There is Some Truth in That http://jonathanichikawa.net Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa Wed, 07 Mar 2012 02:07:30 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 Comment on Dretske, Information, and Knowledge by jonathan weinberg http://jonathanichikawa.net/archives/462#comment-3586 jonathan weinberg Wed, 07 Mar 2012 02:07:30 +0000 http://jonathanichikawa.net/?p=462#comment-3586 It's not a question of what is or isn't a cause or "causal influence" more generally. It's about the kind (or maybe degree?) of causation that is information-preserving in a potentially knowledge-conferring sort of way. I think of you look, e.g., at his spy/doorknock discussion, you'll see a degree of specificity is required for that sort of causation. But that specificity is missing when my reception of your testimony isn't sensitive to its being knowledgy. It’s not a question of what is or isn’t a cause or “causal influence” more generally. It’s about the kind (or maybe degree?) of causation that is information-preserving in a potentially knowledge-conferring sort of way. I think of you look, e.g., at his spy/doorknock discussion, you’ll see a degree of specificity is required for that sort of causation. But that specificity is missing when my reception of your testimony isn’t sensitive to its being knowledgy.

]]> Comment on Dretske, Information, and Knowledge by Jonathan http://jonathanichikawa.net/archives/462#comment-3584 Jonathan Tue, 06 Mar 2012 23:19:27 +0000 http://jonathanichikawa.net/?p=462#comment-3584 So as I understand Dretske's view, S's being F carries the information that p if there's no way for S to be F without p being the case. As you've said, if we let S be me and F be the property of testifying that p, then S's being F cannot carry the information that p. I agree. My suggestion, however, is that we consider a different property that I have. In particular, let S be me and F be the property of knowledgably testifying that p. Now that S is F does carry the information that p; there's no way for S to be F without p being the case. Furthermore, I think that you can be causally impacted by S's being F in this case. That means that you respond one way if S is F, and another way if S isn't F. That's good enough for transmission of knowledge, on Dretske's view. In your earlier argument, you suggested that you're not causally impacted by S's being F, because there's some possible way for S to be (ignorantly asserting that p) that would have had the same affect on you. While this is true, I don't think it shows that you can't be causally impacted by S's being F -- the implicit principle, that X's being G cannot cause Y unless there is no other possible way for X to be that would have resulted in Y, doesn't look true. So as I understand Dretske’s view, S’s being F carries the information that p if there’s no way for S to be F without p being the case.

As you’ve said, if we let S be me and F be the property of testifying that p, then S’s being F cannot carry the information that p. I agree. My suggestion, however, is that we consider a different property that I have. In particular, let S be me and F be the property of knowledgably testifying that p. Now that S is F does carry the information that p; there’s no way for S to be F without p being the case.

Furthermore, I think that you can be causally impacted by S’s being F in this case. That means that you respond one way if S is F, and another way if S isn’t F. That’s good enough for transmission of knowledge, on Dretske’s view.

In your earlier argument, you suggested that you’re not causally impacted by S’s being F, because there’s some possible way for S to be (ignorantly asserting that p) that would have had the same affect on you. While this is true, I don’t think it shows that you can’t be causally impacted by S’s being F — the implicit principle, that X’s being G cannot cause Y unless there is no other possible way for X to be that would have resulted in Y, doesn’t look true.

]]> Comment on Dretske, Information, and Knowledge by jonathan weinberg http://jonathanichikawa.net/archives/462#comment-3583 jonathan weinberg Tue, 06 Mar 2012 22:55:55 +0000 http://jonathanichikawa.net/?p=462#comment-3583 I think that might be right, that if your testifying that P _at all_ is something that can only happen, with probability = 1, when you know that P, then your testifying in and of itself will carry that information that P. But: "lots of times" isn't going to cut it -- if there are also times when you would testify without knowledge that P, but I would generally react to your testimony in just the same way as when you do testify with knowledge that P, then knowledge-sufficient information that P will not flow through your testimony, on Dretske's account. I think that might be right, that if your testifying that P _at all_ is something that can only happen, with probability = 1, when you know that P, then your testifying in and of itself will carry that information that P.

But: “lots of times” isn’t going to cut it — if there are also times when you would testify without knowledge that P, but I would generally react to your testimony in just the same way as when you do testify with knowledge that P, then knowledge-sufficient information that P will not flow through your testimony, on Dretske’s account.

]]> Comment on Dretske, Information, and Knowledge by Jonathan http://jonathanichikawa.net/archives/462#comment-3581 Jonathan Tue, 06 Mar 2012 18:58:56 +0000 http://jonathanichikawa.net/?p=462#comment-3581 I don't think we need to say that. We need for you to be sensitive to whether I testify-with-knowledge or not, but that doesn't mean we need you to be sensitive to the difference between knowledgable and non-knowledgable testimony. To make this line work, we need to say that if I hadn't testified-with-knowledge, then I wouldn't have testified at all. And lots of the time, this is correct: if I hadn't known it, I wouldn't have said it. (These are the sorts of situations in which testimonial knowledge is intuitively plausible.) I don’t think we need to say that. We need for you to be sensitive to whether I testify-with-knowledge or not, but that doesn’t mean we need you to be sensitive to the difference between knowledgable and non-knowledgable testimony. To make this line work, we need to say that if I hadn’t testified-with-knowledge, then I wouldn’t have testified at all. And lots of the time, this is correct: if I hadn’t known it, I wouldn’t have said it. (These are the sorts of situations in which testimonial knowledge is intuitively plausible.)

]]> Comment on Dretske, Information, and Knowledge by jonathan weinberg http://jonathanichikawa.net/archives/462#comment-3574 jonathan weinberg Mon, 05 Mar 2012 22:19:54 +0000 http://jonathanichikawa.net/?p=462#comment-3574 The problem there is that <i>I</i> would need to be appropriately sensitive to the difference between your knowledgeable and your other-than-knowledgeable testimony. I was assuming that that is not the case -- that I have no special sensitivity to which of your tellings are or are not caused by your knowledge. (Would that I did! It would make our debates much quicker to resolve!) So, if I would come to believe P on your say-so in the same way in either case, then it is merely <i>that you testified that P</i>, and not <i>that you testified knowledgeably that P</i>, which will be doing the causal work, and will bring whatever information it has with it. The problem there is that I would need to be appropriately sensitive to the difference between your knowledgeable and your other-than-knowledgeable testimony. I was assuming that that is not the case — that I have no special sensitivity to which of your tellings are or are not caused by your knowledge. (Would that I did! It would make our debates much quicker to resolve!)

So, if I would come to believe P on your say-so in the same way in either case, then it is merely that you testified that P, and not that you testified knowledgeably that P, which will be doing the causal work, and will bring whatever information it has with it.

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