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INTRODUCTION

Often, philosophy saliently proceeds via appeals to intuition. In a prototypical instance, a theory is rejected on the basis of its counterintuitive verdict about a real or hypothetical case. In recent decades, significant metaphilosophical attention has turned to the use of intuitions in philosophy. What are intuitions? Why should we trust them? What can they show us? This entry focuses on contemporary work on these and related topics.

GENERAL OVERVIEWS

There are relatively few non-partisan introductions to the topic of intuitions in philosophy, although Nagel (2007) is a concise and helpful exception; it focuses on epistemic intuitions in particular, but much of its content will generalize. Nichols & Knobe (2008) introduces the experimental philosophy movement, with an emphasis on nonskeptical experimental philosophy (see Experimental Philosophy). Pust (2000) is a book-length presentation of a traditional approach to intuitions in philosophy, while Williamson (2004) gives a much more deflationary treatment of philosophical intuitions. Grundmann (2007) is also listed, as it contains discussion and criticism of a wide variety of approaches.

Grundmann, Thomas (2007). *The Nature of Rational Intuitions and A Fresh Look at the Explanationist Objection. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74.*

[Offers a traditional picture of rational intuition. Intuitions are evidential sources based in understanding. Responds to explanationist skepticism. Also contains good overview of recent approaches to intuition.]

Knobe, J. & Nichols, S. (2008). An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto. In Knobe, J. & Nichols, S. (eds.). (2008). *Experimental Philosophy*, New York: Oxford University Press.

[An articulation and defense of the relevance of experimental work to philosophy. Emphasizes the philosophical interest of psychological facts, and the role of experimental data as a supplement to traditional philosophical theorizing.]

Pust, J. (2000). *Intuitions as Evidence*. New York: Garland.

[A monograph treatment of the use of intuitions in philosophy. Defends a psychologistic, seeming-based account of intuition, and defends the use of intuitions as evidence in philosophy from skeptical arguments.]

Nagel, J. (2007). Epistemic Intuitions, *Philosophy Compass* 2/6, 792-819.

[An excellent comprehensive primer on intuition. Focuses on intuitions in epistemology, but largely generalizable to all philosophical intuitions. Emphasis on intuitions in the history of philosophy, and on recent psychological data about intuitions.]

Williamson, T. (2004). Philosophical 'Intuitions' and Scepticism about Judgment, *Dialectica* 58, 109-53.

[Defends a reductivist view according to which 'intuitions' are judgments or inclinations to judge. There are general reasons to think judgments generally reliable, so there is no particular skeptical challenge to use of intuitions in philosophy. Substantially overlaps chs. 7-8 of Williamson (2007), though the latter is more eliminativist than reductivist.]

ANTHOLOGIES AND COLLECTIONS

As philosophical attention to philosophical methods has increased, a number of collections have been published in recent years. *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 74 and *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 31 are both special issues focusing on intuitions and philosophical methodology, containing diverse contemporary discussions of value for researchers in the area. Nichols & Knobe (2008) is a good introduction to experimental philosophy, suitable for an advanced undergraduate or graduate course. Gendler & Hawthorne (2004) is not devoted specifically to methodology, but many of the discussions of modal epistemology are of methodological significance; so likewise with Boghossian & Peacocke (2000)'s contribution on the *a priori*. Because scrutiny in metaphilosophy has developed so quickly and recently, much of DePaul & Ramsey (1998) is already somewhat dated.

Boghossian, P. and Peacocke, C. (eds.). (2000). *New Essays on the A Priori*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[A collection of new articles by leading figures on apriority in philosophy. The short introduction provides a concise introduction to the area, emphasizing the distinction between enabling and warranting experience. Most of the essays are written at a fairly high philosophical level; recommended for graduate seminars and up.]

DePaul, M. and Ramsey, W. (eds.). (1997). *Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry*, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

[The first major anthology on intuitions, containing an early survey of philosophical approaches to intuitions. Particular emphasis on the psychological origins of intuitions and skepticism about their use in philosophy. Includes important precursors to the experimental philosophy movement.]

Gendler, T. Z. and Hawthorne, J. (eds.). *Conceivability and Possibility*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[A major anthology in modal epistemology, including several discussions of the role of intuitions in modal epistemology.]

Knobe, J. & Nichols, S. (eds.). (2008). *Experimental Philosophy*, New York: Oxford University Press.

[A collection of (mostly reprinted) essays characterizing experimental philosophy. A particular emphasis on the role of experimental data in moral philosophy, but also includes early discussions of epistemology. Well-suited for a graduate-level or advanced undergraduate course.]

Special issue on Philosophical Knowledge. C. Beyer & A. Burri (Eds.) *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 74 (2007)

[Proceedings of a conference on philosophical methodology.]

Special issue on Philosophy and the Empirical, *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 31 (2007)

[Special issue on empirical investigation on intuitions in philosophy.]

MODELS OF INTUITIONS

Although most philosophers working on intuitions share the common idea that philosophy relies in important ways on intuitions, there is not a consensus account of what intuitions are. This section highlights a few prominent approaches to intuition. Bealer (1992) and Pust (2000) defend an account of intuitions as a special kind of ‘intellectual seeming’, analogous to perceptual appearance. Sosa (1997) and (2007) and Ludwig (2007), by contrast, characterize intuitions via etiology; intuitions are judgments or inclinations that arise from particular sorts of understanding. A very

different, more deflationary approach is given by Devitt (2006) and Williamson (2007); on their approach, intuitions are just general judgments or inclinations to judge, without any distinctive epistemological role to play.

Bealer, G. (1992) 'The Incoherence of Empiricism', *The Aristotelean Society Supplementary* 66, 99-138.

[Defends a 'seeming'-based account of philosophical intuitions, and argues that intuitions, so construed, are important *prima facie* evidence in philosophy. Argues that appeal to intuition is an essential part of any argument -- including empiricist arguments designed to undercut the probative value of intuitions.]

Devitt, M. (2006) Intuitions, *Ontology Studies Cuadernos de Ontologia: Proceedings of VI International Ontology Congress* Victor Gomez Pin, Jose Ignacio Galparaso, and Gotzon Arrizabalaga, eds. 169-76.

[Defends a naturalistic approach to intuitions; intuitions are a posteriori judgments, and have a legitimate, if limited, role in philosophical methodology.]

Ludwig, Kirk. (2007). The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 31: 128-159.

[Defends an understanding-based approach to intuitions and the epistemology of philosophy.]

Pust, J. (2000). *Intuitions as Evidence*. New York: Garland.

[A monograph treatment of the use of intuitions in philosophy. Defends a psychological, seeming-based account of intuition, and defends the use of intuitions as evidence in philosophy from skeptical arguments.]

Sosa, E. (1997). "Minimal Intuition", *Rethinking Intuition*, (eds.) M. R. DePaul & W. Ramsey, Oxford: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

[Offers an account of intuition in terms of understanding; intuitions are cases of belief about abstracta, triggered by understanding. Emphasizes parallels with other sources of knowledge, such as memory and introspection. Argues that intuitions can provide warrant for belief, at least in favorable circumstances.]

Williamson, T. (2004). Philosophical 'Intuitions' and Scepticism about Judgment, *Dialectica* 58, 109-53.

[Defends a reductivist view according to which 'intuitions' are judgments or inclinations to judge. There are general reasons to think judgments generally reliable, so there is no particular skeptical challenge to use of intuitions in philosophy. Substantially overlaps chs. 7-8 of Williamson (2007), though the latter is more eliminativist than reductivist.]

EPISTEMOLOGY OF PHILOSOPHY

How do philosophers come to know philosophical truths? If philosophers are relying on intuitions, is this a trustworthy methodology? This section is divided into two subsections: **Worries** about traditional, intuition-based methodology, and **Defenses** of it.

Worries

This section lists some influential articulations of worries about intuition-based philosophical methodology. (Worries deriving from experimental philosophy have, somewhat artificially, been excluded here; see **Experimental Philosophy**.) Cummins (1998) contains an important early critique in the ‘explanationist objection’, while Stich (1990) and Bishop & Stich (1998) contain important precursors to experimental-philosophy-based worries. Kornblith (2007) relates the use of intuitions to naturalism. Hintikka’s (1999) critique charges that philosophical methodology is insufficiently attentive to its own practices. Gopnik & Schwitzgebel (1998) suggest that significant data from developmental psychology is neglected in philosophical inquiry.

Cummins, R. (1998). “Reflections on Reflective Equilibrium”, *Rethinking Intuition*, (eds.) M. R. DePaul & W. Ramsey, Oxford: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

[Argues that intuitions cannot be calibrated--their reliability cannot be verified by independent means. Therefore they ought not to be trusted.]

Gopnik, A., & Schwitzgebel, E. (1998). Whose concepts are they, anyway? The role of philosophical intuition in empirical psychology. In M. DePaul & W. Ramsey (Eds.), *Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry*: 75-91. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

[Explores the role that developmental psychology can and should play in the use of intuitions in philosophy.]

Hintikka, J. (1999) ‘The Emperor’s New Intuitions’, *The Journal of Philosophy* 96, 127-47.

[Traces the contemporary philosophical practice of appeal to intuitions to the mid-twentieth century. Argues that such appeals are now made absent any epistemological explanation justifying the practice, and that therefore, it ought to be abandoned.]

Kornblith, Hilary. (2007). Naturalism and Intuitions. *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 74.

[Argues that a naturalistic conception of philosophy is inconsistent with traditional reliance on intuitions. Empirical work in psychology demonstrates that the project of conceptual analysis is futile; we ought not to give intuitions more than a very limited role.]

Bishop, M., & Stich, S. (1998). The flight to reference, or how *not* to make progress in the philosophy of science. *Philosophy of Science*, 65.1: 33-49. [Argues that philosophical arguments that proceed via considerations of semantic reference—i.e., eliminativism about mental attitudes, based on descriptivist approaches to reference—should be abandoned.]

Stich, S. (1990). *The Fragmentation of Reason*. Cambridge: MIT Press. [Argues that reliance on intuition proceeds from the unwarranted assumption that intuitions must be universal; since people with systematically false intuitions are possible, we ought not to give our own intuitions normative weight.]

Defenses

A central worry about the use of intuitions in philosophy is that it isn't clear how an intuition-based epistemology of philosophy could proceed. This section includes several prominent attempts to articulate such programs. See also **Understanding and Apriority** and **Conceptual Analysis**. Bealer (1992) and (1998), Ludwig (2007), and Grundmann (2007) are significant canonical statements of contemporary rationalism, while Fricker (1995), Levin (2004), and Williamson (2007) connect philosophical intuition to more general kinds of reasoning. Pust (2000) and (2001) offer a resistance to explanationist skepticism; Sosa (2007) extends his virtue epistemology to intuitions in philosophy.

Bealer, G. (1992) 'The Incoherence of Empiricism', *The Aristotelean Society Supplementary* 66, 99-138. [Defends a 'seeming'-based account of philosophical intuitions, and argues that intuitions, so construed, are important *prima facie* evidence in philosophy. Argues that appeal to intuition is an essential part of any argument—including empiricist arguments designed to undercut the probative value of intuitions.]

Bealer, G. (1998). Intuition and the autonomy of philosophy. In Michael DePaul and William Ramsey Eds., *Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry* (pp. 201-239). Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. [A strong version of a philosophical exceptionalist view: philosophical inquiry is independent from science; and, when science conflicts, philosophy is authoritative.]

Fricker, Miranda. (1995). Intuition and Reason. *The Philosophical Quarterly* 45 No. 179: 1818-189. [Argues that intuition and reason are tightly connected.]

- Ludwig, Kirk. (2007). The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 31: 128-159.
[Defends an understanding-based approach to intuitions and the epistemology of philosophy. Intuitions are products of pure conceptual competence, and thus a perfectly reliable guide to philosophical truth.]
- Grundmann, Thomas (2007). The Nature of Rational Intuitions and A Fresh Look at the Explanationist Objection. *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 74.
[Offers a traditional picture of rational intuition. Intuitions are evidential sources based in understanding. Responds to explanationist skepticism. Also contains good overview of recent approaches to intuition.]
- Levin, Janet. (2004). The Evidential Status of Philosophical Intuition. *Philosophical Studies* 121: 193-224.
[A new account of philosophical intuition and its evidential status, one that combines traditionalist with naturalist elements.]
- Pust, J. (2000). *Intuitions as Evidence*. New York: Garland.
[A monograph treatment of the use of intuitions in philosophy. Defends a psychologistic, seeming-based account of intuition, and defends the use of intuitions as evidence in philosophy from skeptical arguments.]
- Pust, J. (2001) Against Explanationist Skepticism Regarding Philosophical intuitions, *Philosophical Studies* 106, 227-58.
[Defends the use of intuitions in philosophy against skeptical arguments that treat intuitions merely as psychological entities to be explained. Such skeptical arguments are epistemically self-defeating.]
- Sosa, E. (2007) *A Virtue Epistemology*. New York: Oxford University Press
[A sustained defense and articulation of a virtue-theoretic approach to epistemology. Chapter 3 applies the approach to intuitions: intuition is the product of a reliabilistic competence to believe certain truths. On this model, intuitions can serve as regress-stoppers in a foundationalist epistemology. This even though, unlike such traditional foundations as sensory experience, intuitions, being conceptual, are rationally assessable.]
- Williamson, T. (2007) *The Philosophy of Philosophy*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Press.
[A central piece in contemporary metaphilosophy. Defends an anti-exceptionalist approach to philosophy: philosophy works the same way as does inquiry generally, and intuitions do not play a distinctive role in philosophy; widespread statements to the contrary misdescribe proper philosophical practice.]

UNDERSTANDING AND APRIORITY

According to a traditional view, philosophical investigation can proceed via invocation of intuition because there are tight links between understanding and intuition; according to one version of the view, to understand a concept fully entails that one's intuitions about its application will be reliable. These essays develop and investigate this idea. Jackson (2000) and (2004) develop a two-dimensionalist approach to understanding and apriority; Peacocke (2000) defends a similar view. This approach is criticized in Williamson (2007a), which is generally incorporated into chapter 4 of Williamson (2007b). See also **conceptual analysis**. Bealer (1998) and Sosa (2007) link understanding to apriority without two-dimensionalism, by restricting the relevant domains to philosophical subject matters.

Bealer, G. (1998). Intuition and the autonomy of philosophy. In Michael DePaul and William Ramsey Eds., *Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry* (pp. 201-239). Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

[A strong version of a philosophical exceptionalist view: philosophical inquiry is independent from science; and, when science conflicts, philosophy is authoritative.]

Jackson, F. (2000). 'Representation, Scepticism, and the A Priori', *New Essays on the A Priori*, (eds.) P. Boghossian & C. Peacocke, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[Argues that general considerations about representation and communication entail that if logic is *a priori*, then so are many 'conceptual analysis' sentences.]

Jackson, F. (2004). 'Why we need A-intensions', *Philosophical Studies* 116, 257-277.

[Defends apriority against concerns from the necessary *a posteriori*. An argument that our ability to use language requires us to grasp the representational contents of terms like 'water'.]

Peacocke, C. (2000). 'Explaining the A Priori: The Programme of Moderate Rationalism', *New Essays on the A Priori*, (eds.) P. Boghossian & C. Peacocke, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[Attempts to explain *a priori* knowledge by arguing that, in favorable cases, the individuation conditions for the possession of concepts track the truth conditions of their target properties. The semantic value of, *e.g.*, logical constant concepts is fixed by the inferences we're prepared to draw, in a way guaranteed to preserve truth.]

Sosa, E. (2007) *A Virtue Epistemology*. New York: Oxford University Press
[A sustained defense and articulation of a virtue-theoretic approach to epistemology. Chapter 3 applies the approach to intuitions: intuition is the product of a reliabilistic competence to believe certain truths. On this model, intuitions can serve as regress-stoppers in a foundationalist epistemology. This even though, unlike such traditional foundations as sensory experience, intuitions, being conceptual, are rationally assessable.]

Williamson, T. (2007a). 'Conceptual Truth', *The Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 80, 1-41.
[Argues against epistemic conceptions of analyticity; understanding is never sufficient for knowledge of any sentences or thoughts, since it is possible, consistent with understanding, to adopt views that require their rejection. Substantially overlaps chapter 4 of Williamson (2007b).]

Williamson, T. (2007b) *The Philosophy of Philosophy*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Press.
[A treatment of philosophical methodology emphasizing continuity with other disciplines. Rejects psychologistic conceptions of philosophical subject matter and evidence. Rejects apriority and analyticity.]

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

A traditional philosophical project is to provide an *analysis* of some target concept; intuitions are thought to play important roles in constructing and refuting such analyses. Jackson (1998) and Goldman (2007) offer two rather different ways of developing this idea, but the project faces important criticisms, such as those presented by Bishop (1992) and Kornblith (2002) and especially (2007). Weatherson (2003) suggests a more limited role for intuition and conceptual analysis, raising questions about how tightly reference matches intuitions.

Jackson, F. (1998). *From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis*. New York: Oxford University Press.
[A central and influential work, defending a two-dimensionalist semantics with a central role for *a priori* conceptual analysis.]

Bishop, M. (1992). The Possibility of Conceptual Clarity in Philosophy. *American Philosophical Quarterly* 29: 267-277.
[Argues that prototypically armchair cases of 'counterexample philosophy' is not well-suited to provide clarity; philosophy is 'hostage to empirical fact', and therefore should proceed on a scientific model.]

Kornblith, H. (2002). *Knowledge and Its Place in Nature*. New York: Oxford University Press.

[Defends a naturalistic epistemology, advocating the scientific study of knowledge in non-human animals. Intuitions have a role only in initial, tentative, data-collection.]

Kornblith, Hilary. (2007). Naturalism and Intuitions. *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 74.

[Argues that a naturalistic conception of philosophy is inconsistent with traditional reliance on intuitions. Empirical work in psychology demonstrates that the project of conceptual analysis is futile; we ought not to give intuitions more than a very limited role.]

Goldman, A. (2007). Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status, *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 74, 1-26.

[Considers the subject matter of philosophy. Argues that, since intuitions are used as evidence in philosophy, philosophers must be studying individual mentalistic concepts. Intuitions are reliable evidence for facts about these concepts.]

Weatherson, Brian. (2003). What Good Are Counterexamples? *Philosophical Studies* 115: 1-31.

[Argues that central philosophical intuitions, like the Gettier intuition, cannot be as straightforwardly applied as is standard practice. Following Lewis, naturalness can play a role in fixing reference; a simpler theory with counterintuitive consequences may be correct.]

EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY

A contemporary movement of 'experimental philosophy' has gained recent prominence. Experimental philosophers emphasize the place in philosophical investigation for empirical data, collected using the methods of science, typically psychology. Some experimental philosophers have argued that empirical investigation shows armchair methodology to be importantly misguided; other, non-skeptical, uses of experimental philosophy seek merely to enrich our understanding of, e.g., various philosophical concepts. Skeptical arguments are considered in **Data, Theory, and Responses**; non-skeptical uses of experimental philosophy are highlighted in **Non-Skeptical Experimental Philosophy**.

Data

This section includes papers that present particular empirical results that are thought to challenge certain kinds of armchair investigation. Weinberg et. al. (2001), Nichols et. al. (2003), and Swain et. al. (2007) find divergence with respect to various intuitions in epistemology, while Machery et. al. (2004) finds divergence with respect to intuitions about reference. These pieces suggest that armchair reliance on intuition is threatened by this cross-cultural and temporal divergence. Green (2003) and Horowitz (1998) are

concerned with moral intuitions: Green (2003) suggests that neuroscientific considerations give us reason to be suspicious of certain moral intuitions; Horowitz (1998) draws the same conclusion from considerations of psychological theorizing about reasoning with gains and losses. For more abstract presentations of experimental criticisms of armchair methodology, see **Experimental Philosophy: Theory**. For defenses of the use of armchair intuitions, see **Experimental Philosophy: Responses**.

Greene, J. (2003). From neural 'is' to moral 'ought': What are the moral implications of neuroscientific moral psychology. *Neuroscience*, 4, 847-850.

[A neuroscientific study of brain patterns underwriting different kinds of moral intuitions. Suggests that such data gives reason to question moral realism.]

Horowitz, Tamara. (1998). Philosophical intuitions and psychological theory. In M. & Ramsey DePaul, W. (Ed.), *Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry*: 143-159. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

[Explains away a particular sort of anti-consequentialist ethical intuition by attributing it to a general tendency to overestimate the value of losses relative to gains. Grounded in Kahneman & Tversky's influential prospect theory.]

Machery, M., Mallon, R., Nichols, S., and Stich, S. (2004). Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style. (2004) *Cognition* 92, B1-B12.

[Finds cross-cultural divergence with respect to Kripkean anti-descriptivist intuitions about proper names. East Asians are found more likely to report descriptivist intuitions than are Westerners. Concludes Kripke's methodology is importantly flawed.]

Nichols, S; Stich, S; and Weinberg, J. (2003). Metaskepticism: Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology. In *The Sceptics* ed. Luper, S. Ashgate Publishing: 227-247.

[Finds evidence that skeptical intuitions in epistemology vary cross-culturally.]

Swain, S., Alexander, J., and Weinberg, J. (2008). 'The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 76, 138-55.

[An empirical study indicating that some epistemic intuitions--judgments about Keith Lehrer's TrueTemp case--tend to vary according to presentation order. Draws skeptical morals about the use of intuitions in philosophy.]

- Weinberg, J., Nichols, S., and Stich, S. (2001) 'Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions', *Philosophical Topics* 29, 429-60.
[The first major survey-based challenge to traditional philosophical methodology. Presents data indicating that influential intuitions in epistemology vary according to cultural background, and therefore ought not to be relied upon in epistemology.]

Theory

This section lists more theoretical treatments of experimentally-based skepticism about elements of traditional philosophical methodology; these papers attempt to articulate in some detail just how it is that the data discovered and emphasized by experimental philosophers bears against traditional intuition-based philosophical methodology. Bishop & Trout (2005) and Alexander & Weinberg (2007) focus on epistemology—particularly its normative elements, while Mallon et. al. applies experimental work on intuitions about reference to philosophy of language and its uses elsewhere in philosophy. Singer (2005) questions the use of ethical intuitions against utilitarianism. Weinberg (2007) is a general treatment of experimental-philosophy-based skepticism about philosophical methods.

- Alexander, J & Weinberg, J. (2007). Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy. *Philosophy Compass* 2.1: 56-80.
[An accessible and clear summary of experimental pressure against armchair methodology in epistemology. Considers prominent objections to standard skeptical arguments; a good initial resource for this area.]
- Bishop, M., & Trout, J.D. (2005). The pathologies of standard analytic epistemology. *Nous*, 39.4: 696-714.
[Argues that armchair methods are ill-suited to draw normative conclusions in epistemology; epistemologists should attend more to psychological results, and less to their own intuitions.]
- Weinberg, J. (2007) 'How to Challenge Intuitions Empirically without Risking Skepticism', *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 31, 318-43.
[Refines the experimentalist critique of armchair philosophy, distinguishing survey-based arguments against traditional philosophical methodology from general skeptical arguments that generalize beyond philosophical intuitions.]
- Mallon, R., Machery, E., Nichols, S., & Stich, S. (forthcoming). Against arguments from reference. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.
[Attacks philosophical arguments that proceeds from arguments about semantic reference. Theories of reference are problematically based in intuition.]

- Singer, P. (2005). Ethical Intuitions. *The Journal of Ethics* 9: 331-352.
[Argues that certain moral intuitions, being the products of evolutionary history, ought to be treated with less probative force than is standard. Singer's empirical argument proceeds from neuroscience, instead of surveys.]

Responses

This section lists some significant responses to skeptical pressure from experimental philosophy. Deutsch (forthcoming) and Devitt (forthcoming) respond in particular to Machery et. al.'s concerns about reference; the other papers listed offer a more general defense against worries from experimental philosophy. Kauppinen (2007) and Sosa (2009) emphasize the limitations of survey results on which many experimental philosophers rely, while Liao (2007) and Sosa (2008) defend the use of intuitions more directly. Williamson (2009) argues that experimental objections to philosophy will generalize to science.

- Deutsch, M. (Forthcoming). Experimental Philosophy and Theory of Reference. *Mind & Language*.
[Disputes the assumption that standard philosophical practice invokes intuitions as evidence; a response to Machery, Mallon, Nichols, & Stich (2004). Cites the importance of facts about reference, instead of intuitions about reference.]
- Devitt, M. (Forthcoming). "Experimental Semantics", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.
[Argues that Machery et. al.'s argument against Kripkean anti-descriptivism overestimates the extent to which Kripke relies on intuitions about reference. Metaphysical intuitions play a more central role than is appreciated.]
- Kauppinen, A. (2007). The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy. *Philosophical Explorations* 10.2: 95-118.
[Argues that much survey-based experimental philosophy fails to target the relevant phenomena: considered, reflective judgments. Casual surveys are too likely to issue into pragmatic confusions and performance errors.]
- Liao, S.M. (2007). A Defense of Intuition. *Philosophical Studies*.
[Argues that one upshot of experimental philosophy is that many intuitions are very reliable. Suggests that a treatment of 'robust intuitions' can resist the skeptical critique.]

- Sosa, E. (2008). Experimental Philosophy & Philosophical Intuition. In *Experimental Philosophy*. Eds. Knobe, J & Nichols, S. Oxford University Press.
[Defends a virtue-theoretic account of philosophical intuition; argues that skeptical arguments from cultural diversity can be explained by attributing to the different cultures different concepts, or different ways of understanding thought experiment probes.]
- Sosa, E. (2009). A Defense of the Use of Intuitions in Philosophy. In *Stich and His Critics*. Eds. Murphy, D & Bishop, M. Wiley-Blackwell.
[Defends the use of intuitions in philosophy against objections based on survey results.]
- Williamson, T. (2009) Replies to Ichikawa, Martin, and Weinberg, *Philosophical Studies*
[Argues, in response to Weinberg, that recent experimentalist skepticism about philosophy will extend to skepticism generally. Experimental results have not established strong reasons for worry about armchair methodology. See also Williamson (2004), Philosophical 'Intuitions' and Scepticism about Judgment, *Dialectica* 58, 109-53.]

Non-Skeptical Experimental Philosophy

Not all experimental philosophy is presented with the intent of undermining armchair methodology; some work in the field is offered merely as an addition to extant methods, that can shed new light on philosophically interesting empirical questions. Knobe & Nichols (2008), Knobe (2007), and Nadelhoffer & Nahimas (2007) make this especially clear. Knobe (2003) presents a widely-cited instance of this sort of psychological discovery.

- Knobe, J. (2003). Intentional action in folk psychology: An experimental investigation. *Philosophical Psychology*, 16(2), 309-323.
[Experimental results reveal that judgments about intentionality of action depend on moral evaluation.]
- Knobe, Joshua. (2007). Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Significance. *Philosophical Explorations* 10.2: 119-121.
[A very brief and clear statement of non-skeptical experimental philosophy: traditional philosophy investigated questions about the mind; experiments are the best way to study those questions.]

Knobe, J. & Nichols, S. (2008). An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto. In Knobe, J. & Nichols, S. (eds.). (2008). *Experimental Philosophy*, New York: Oxford University Press.

[An articulation and defense of the relevance of experimental work to philosophy. Emphasizes the philosophical interest of psychological facts, and the role of experimental data as a supplement to traditional philosophical theorizing.]

Nadelhoffer, Thomas & Nahimas, Eddy. (2007). The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy. *Philosophical Explorations* 10.2: 123-149.
[An articulation of a broader conception of experimental philosophy, emphasizing positive empirical contributions to philosophical questions. Emphasizes the independence of this project from the skeptical one.]

THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS

A ubiquitous tool in philosophy is the thought experiment. How are philosophers able to come to new knowledge by considering imaginary scenarios? Sorensen (1992) emphasizes similarities between philosophical thought experiments and scientific ones; this is likewise the subject of Gendler (2004), Brown (2004), and Norton (2004). Williamson (2005) offers an account of thought experiment judgments in terms of counterfactuals; this is criticized in favor of a more traditional approach in Ichikawa & Jarvis (2009).

Brown, J. (2004), Peeking into Plato's Heaven. *Philosophy of Science*, vol. 71, 1126-1138

[Classic thought experiments discussed. An a prioristic and Platonistic account of thought experiments is proposed. The proving of theorems in mathematics with pictures and diagrams is compared.]

Norton, J., (2004) On Thought Experiments: Is There More to the Argument?, *Philosophy of Science*, 71: 1139-1151.

[Defends an empiricist approach to thought experiments in science.]

Gendler, Tamar. (2007). Philosophical Thought Experiments, Intuitions, and Cognitive Equilibrium. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 31: 68-89.

[Emphasizes the non-rational psychological influence of thought experiment reasoning. Thought experiments are tools to bring about different ways of looking at a question.]

Gendler, T., (2004) Thought Experiments Rethought -- and Reperceived. *Philosophy of Science*, 71: 1152-1164.

[Emphasizes the uses of thought experiments beyond the straightforwardly rational ones: thought experiments help us to consider problems in different lights.]

Sorensen, R. (1992) *Thought Experiments*, Oxford: OUP.

[Argues that thought experiments invariably take the form of a paradox and that they function similarly in science as in philosophy.]

Ichikawa, J and Jarvis, B. (2009). Thought-Experiment intuitions and truth in fiction. *Philosophical Studies*.

[Thought-experiment intuitions are a priori judgments of necessary facts about fictional situations.]

Williamson, T. (2005) Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 105.1: 1-23.

[Defends an approach to thought experiments in terms of counterfactuals; judgments about thought experiment situations, and about possibility and necessity, are a special case of counterfactual reasoning.]

INTERNET RESOURCES

There are several internet resources that are relevant to the use of intuitions in philosophy.

Stanford Encyclopedia Article on Thought Experiments:

<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thought-experiment/>

[A comprehensive overview of thought experiments in science and philosophy.]

The Arché Intuitions and Methodology Project Weblog: <http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~armeth/>

[Includes discussion of current ideas in metaphilosophy, as well as announcements of relevant papers, upcoming events, etc.]

The Experimental Philosophy Weblog:

http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/experimental_philosophy/

[The online center of the experimental philosophy movement; a large and diverse team of authors discuss work relevant to experimental philosophy and announce new papers.]

The PhilPapers 'Intuition' category: <http://philpapers.org/browse/intuition/>

[A comprehensive collection of papers about intuition available online. Updated regularly.]