Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Posted in Philosophy on Oct 5th, 2010
A robust and celebrated fact is that imagining that p is often in various respects similar to believing that p. For example, when I imagine, say in the context of engaging with a fiction, that a great injustice has been committed, I feel angry in a way similar to the way I’d feel if I [...]
Posted in Philosophy on Sep 30th, 2010
According to a common view, beliefs suffer a coherence constraint that desires do not. If I believe that p, then I’m very unlikely, at the very same time, to believe that not-p — and if I do, that’s a clear rational failing. But desiring various contradictory things is commonplace. I don’t want to dispute that [...]
Posted in Philosophy on Sep 29th, 2010
Let us suppose that Dmitri knows how to sing the ”Il balen” cadenza from Verdi’s Il Trovatore. There’s a debate about whether Dmitri’s knowing how to sing the cadenza amounts to knowing some proposition. According to ‘intellectualists’, knowing how to X just is (to an approximation), knowing, for some w, that w is a way to X. [...]
Posted in Philosophy on Sep 26th, 2010
Shaun Nichols writes: In addition to a pretense box, Stich and I propose a mechanism that supplies the pretense box with representations that initiate or embellish an episode of pretense, the “Script Elaborator”. This is required to explain the bizarre and creative elements that are evident in much pretend play. However, there are also much [...]