Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Posted in Philosophy on Mar 10th, 2010
Suppose you think that it’s possible to know that p, even though your epistemic position vis-a-vis p is weak enough for ‘it might be that not-p’, in its epistemic reading, to be true. I don’t really see why you’d want to think this myself, but I guess some people think that (a) this is a [...]
Posted in Philosophy on Mar 2nd, 2010
I’ve long been troubled by failing to understand what ‘fallibilism’ and ‘infallibilism’ are supposed to amount to. Here’s an example of the sort of discussion I find puzzling. Bohghossian and Peacocke write: A priori justification is not infallible justification. Just as one may be justified in believing an ordinary empirical proposition that is empirically revealed [...]
Posted in Philosophy on Nov 19th, 2009
This week I’m thinking about Laurence Bonjour’s In Defense of Pure Reason. In §4.4, Bonjour offers what he takes to be a very straightforward argument against the infallibility of rational insight: just look, he says, at all the examples of alleged cases of rational insight that are false — some have been empirically refuted, and [...]