Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Posted in Philosophy on Oct 5th, 2010
A robust and celebrated fact is that imagining that p is often in various respects similar to believing that p. For example, when I imagine, say in the context of engaging with a fiction, that a great injustice has been committed, I feel angry in a way similar to the way I’d feel if I [...]
Posted in Philosophy on Jul 5th, 2009
According to orthodoxy, what’s true in a fiction goes beyond what’s entailed by the text making up the story. Although fictions are gappy (there’s no fact about whether Hamlet had an even number of hairs), some things are determinately true without being stated, or being entailed by thugs that are stated (Hamlet was not a [...]
Posted in Philosophy on Jun 24th, 2009
Something cool happened in our methodology seminar last week. Some people like to remark on real-world Gettier cases they find themselves in. I found myself last week in the presence of a real-life deviant Gettier case. A deviant Gettier case (what Ben Jarvis and I have also called a ‘bad Gettier case’) is a situation [...]
Posted in publications on Jun 20th, 2009
Thought-Experiment Intuitions and Truth in Fiction, with Benjamin Jarvis. (2009) Philosophical Studies 142 (2), January 2009: 221-246. Please refer to published version, available online here. What sorts of things are the intuitions generated via thought experiment? Timothy Williamson has responded to naturalistic skeptics by arguing that thought-experiment intuitions are judgments of ordinary counterfactuals. On this [...]
Posted in on Jun 20th, 2009
I’m an assistant professor in the philosophy department at the University of British Columbia. In 2011-12, I was a postdoc at UBC; before that, I was a postdoc at the Arché Philosophical Research Centre at the University of St Andrews. My Ph.D. is from Rutgers University. My research so far has fallen broadly into three areas of [...]