Posted in Philosophy on Jul 5th, 2009
According to orthodoxy, what’s true in a fiction goes beyond what’s entailed by the text making up the story. Although fictions are gappy (there’s no fact about whether Hamlet had an even number of hairs), some things are determinately true without being stated, or being entailed by thugs that are stated (Hamlet was not a [...]
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Posted in Philosophy on Jun 24th, 2009
Something cool happened in our methodology seminar last week. Some people like to remark on real-world Gettier cases they find themselves in. I found myself last week in the presence of a real-life deviant Gettier case.
A deviant Gettier case (what Ben Jarvis and I have also called a ‘bad Gettier case’) is a situation in [...]
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Posted in publications on Jun 20th, 2009
Thought-Experiment Intuitions and Truth in Fiction, with Benjamin Jarvis. (2009) Philosophical Studies 142 (2), January 2009: 221-246. Please refer to published version, available online here.
What sorts of things are the intuitions generated via thought experiment? Timothy Williamson has responded to naturalistic skeptics by arguing that thought-experiment intuitions are judgments of ordinary counterfactuals. On this view, [...]
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Posted in Uncategorized on Jun 20th, 2009
I’m a postdoctoral research fellow at the Arché Philosophical Research Centre at the University of St Andrews. I’m working on the AHRC-funded ‘Intuitions and Methodology‘ project.
My Ph.D. was at Rutgers University.
My research so far has fallen broadly into three areas of focus (with vague boundaries and overlap): (i) questions in epistemology about knowledge, ‘knows’, safety [...]
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