Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Posted in Philosophy on Feb 29th, 2012
Sanford Goldberg has an interesting new argument against mentalist internalism about justification in Analysis. I’m working on committing myself to an internalist approach to justification at the moment; Goldberg’s new paper isn’t enough to force me to reconsider. The master argument of the paper, which Goldberg lays out quite succinctly, is this, which I quote: [...]
Posted in publications on Jul 23rd, 2011
I’ve never been at all sure what to make of ‘evidentialism’ in epistemology. Following is a fairly naive response to Conee and Feldman; I suspect there’s some discussion of these or closely related issues; I’d be happy to be pointed to them. Conee and Feldman think that the doxastic attitude I’m justified in having toward [...]
Posted in Philosophy on Jul 15th, 2011
I’m starting work on a new project on epistemic justification. I’m trying to begin by laying out various perceived or actual desiderata for theories of epistemic justification. Here’s one, laid out in Alvin Goldman’s classic paper, “What is Justified Belief?”: a theory of justification should give necessary and sufficient conditions in non-epistemic terms. We could [...]
Posted in Philosophy on Jan 27th, 2010
Fantl and McGrath argue that the combination of the following two views is problematic: (JJ) If you are justified in believing that p, then p is warranted enough to justify you in phi-ing, for any phi. (Quoted from p. 99) (Moderate Externalism about Justification) Justification does not supervene on the subject’s internal states. In particular, [...]