Comments on: Contextualism, Intellectualism, and Ignorant Third Persons http://jonathanichikawa.net/weblog/contextualism-intellectualism-and-ignorant-third-persons/ Jonathan Ichikawa's website Thu, 29 Jul 2010 13:00:47 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.7.1 hourly 1 By: There is Some Truth in That » Blog Archive » Contextualist Knowledge Norms http://jonathanichikawa.net/weblog/contextualism-intellectualism-and-ignorant-third-persons/#comment-308 There is Some Truth in That » Blog Archive » Contextualist Knowledge Norms Wed, 24 Feb 2010 04:51:16 +0000 http://jonathanichikawa.net/?p=173#comment-308 [...] worried about, for example, cases in which speakers are ignorant of the subject’s situations. Here is a related blog post.) I’m also worried that there often won’t be a determinate [...] [...] worried about, for example, cases in which speakers are ignorant of the subject’s situations. Here is a related blog post.) I’m also worried that there often won’t be a determinate [...]

]]> By: Molly http://jonathanichikawa.net/weblog/contextualism-intellectualism-and-ignorant-third-persons/#comment-208 Molly Thu, 26 Nov 2009 01:25:32 +0000 http://jonathanichikawa.net/?p=173#comment-208 Isn't Louie's claim that "Howie doesn’t know that p" intuitively true (or at least believable) specifically because we know by stipulation that Louie's standards of knowledge are so much lower than Howie's? So a situation in which Louie might say "Howie doesn't know p" we believe him because what we understand him to be saying is that Howie doesn't know-low that p, and even if Howie only considers himself to know when he knows-high, he certainly doesn't know-high if he doesn't know-low. Similarly (but in reverse) with Howie's statement that "Louie knows that p"; I suspect it's only when you have Howie saying "Louie doesn't know that p", and Louie saying "Howie knows that p" that you even need to bring theories of knowledge into it (and we stop having such sparkling clear intuitions). That is, I think the intuitions come as they do because we are imagining a situation in which 'p' designates the same thing in both cases. For instance, say both men see a cat run behind a bush. Louie might say that he knows that the cat is behind the bush, and Howie might say that he does not know that the cat is behind the bush (it might have jumped into a tunnel, or walked away in a very straight line while obscured from his view). In this case, it seems likely that each man will attribute to the other his own standard of knowledge: Louie will think that they both know that the cat is behind the bush, and Howie will think that neither of them do. Only if the situation is such that one could not even know-low that the cat is behind the bush (e.g., it was on the edge of a dense bramble) will even Louie say that one can't know that the cat is behind the bush. Obviously, the explanation of their knowledge of each other's theories of knowledge works too, but I don't think it's even necessary to explain the intuitions about the situation you outlined in your fourth paragraph. By which I mean that rather important 'cognizant of each other's epistemic positions' clause that I missed when first reading this, possibly because it's after 1 am. Even so, though, I suspect most people have enough intellectual egoism to apply their own epistemic theories to others, even others they know don't share them. (This is Molly, by the way -- I was in your methodologies class in the spring, and just stumbled across your blog.) Isn’t Louie’s claim that “Howie doesn’t know that p” intuitively true (or at least believable) specifically because we know by stipulation that Louie’s standards of knowledge are so much lower than Howie’s? So a situation in which Louie might say “Howie doesn’t know p” we believe him because what we understand him to be saying is that Howie doesn’t know-low that p, and even if Howie only considers himself to know when he knows-high, he certainly doesn’t know-high if he doesn’t know-low. Similarly (but in reverse) with Howie’s statement that “Louie knows that p”; I suspect it’s only when you have Howie saying “Louie doesn’t know that p”, and Louie saying “Howie knows that p” that you even need to bring theories of knowledge into it (and we stop having such sparkling clear intuitions).

That is, I think the intuitions come as they do because we are imagining a situation in which ‘p’ designates the same thing in both cases. For instance, say both men see a cat run behind a bush. Louie might say that he knows that the cat is behind the bush, and Howie might say that he does not know that the cat is behind the bush (it might have jumped into a tunnel, or walked away in a very straight line while obscured from his view). In this case, it seems likely that each man will attribute to the other his own standard of knowledge: Louie will think that they both know that the cat is behind the bush, and Howie will think that neither of them do. Only if the situation is such that one could not even know-low that the cat is behind the bush (e.g., it was on the edge of a dense bramble) will even Louie say that one can’t know that the cat is behind the bush.

Obviously, the explanation of their knowledge of each other’s theories of knowledge works too, but I don’t think it’s even necessary to explain the intuitions about the situation you outlined in your fourth paragraph. By which I mean that rather important ‘cognizant of each other’s epistemic positions’ clause that I missed when first reading this, possibly because it’s after 1 am. Even so, though, I suspect most people have enough intellectual egoism to apply their own epistemic theories to others, even others they know don’t share them.

(This is Molly, by the way — I was in your methodologies class in the spring, and just stumbled across your blog.)

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