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	<title>Comments on: Intuition and experience</title>
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	<pubDate>Wed, 08 Sep 2010 04:01:22 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: Jonathan Weinberg</title>
		<link>http://jonathanichikawa.net/weblog/intuition-and-experience/#comment-298</link>
		<dc:creator>Jonathan Weinberg</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 19 Feb 2010 03:52:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://jonathanichikawa.net/?p=195#comment-298</guid>
		<description>I would think that someone like BonJour could agree with all that.  If by "experience" we don't mean something like "sensory/perceptual experience", but instead something broad enough to include the phenomenology of intuition, then a rationalist of this stripe just isn't going to think it's a good idea to cash out apriority in terms of "independence from experience" so understood.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I would think that someone like BonJour could agree with all that.  If by &#8220;experience&#8221; we don&#8217;t mean something like &#8220;sensory/perceptual experience&#8221;, but instead something broad enough to include the phenomenology of intuition, then a rationalist of this stripe just isn&#8217;t going to think it&#8217;s a good idea to cash out apriority in terms of &#8220;independence from experience&#8221; so understood.</p>
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		<title>By: Andrew Cullison</title>
		<link>http://jonathanichikawa.net/weblog/intuition-and-experience/#comment-296</link>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Cullison</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Feb 2010 17:30:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://jonathanichikawa.net/?p=195#comment-296</guid>
		<description>Seems reasonable to me.  To add:

I think that there are a lot of cases that we would say there was belief formation on the basis of intuition such that, were we to learn that a certain causal story was true - we'd say it was perception. 

Example: 

C onsider a case of someone coming to form a moral belief on the basis of a moral intuition about a particular act token that they observe.  It just seems to them that the burning of the cat is wrong.

Suppose there really are moral properties that cause us to have inclinations to believe moral propositions, perhaps via a feeling of disgust or whatever...

If it really turned out that this was how the belief was formed, it seems to me that this would obviously be a case of experience. 

The only reason I think we call it intuition (as opposed to perception/experience) is that we are not sure what the source of the inclination is. 

So why talk about this:

OPTION ONE:  Someone arguing against you might say....that's how we demarcate experience from intuition...by whether or not a certain background causal story is true such that the phenomenal sensations are caused by the facts in the appropriate way...

OPTION TWO: We say that the causal story is actually not relevant to whether or not it's an experience. If it's not relevant, then the distinction between an intuition and an experience doesn't make much sense to me either. 

So it seems to me like it might be an open question in any case of intuition something very much like perception is occuring (because it's open question whether or not there is a causal story like the one I just told is true).

(p.s. You should think about adding  the Subscribe to Comments by email plugin that let's users check a box and get notified by email about new comments from a particular post they've commented on)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Seems reasonable to me.  To add:</p>
<p>I think that there are a lot of cases that we would say there was belief formation on the basis of intuition such that, were we to learn that a certain causal story was true - we&#8217;d say it was perception. </p>
<p>Example: </p>
<p>C onsider a case of someone coming to form a moral belief on the basis of a moral intuition about a particular act token that they observe.  It just seems to them that the burning of the cat is wrong.</p>
<p>Suppose there really are moral properties that cause us to have inclinations to believe moral propositions, perhaps via a feeling of disgust or whatever&#8230;</p>
<p>If it really turned out that this was how the belief was formed, it seems to me that this would obviously be a case of experience. </p>
<p>The only reason I think we call it intuition (as opposed to perception/experience) is that we are not sure what the source of the inclination is. </p>
<p>So why talk about this:</p>
<p>OPTION ONE:  Someone arguing against you might say&#8230;.that&#8217;s how we demarcate experience from intuition&#8230;by whether or not a certain background causal story is true such that the phenomenal sensations are caused by the facts in the appropriate way&#8230;</p>
<p>OPTION TWO: We say that the causal story is actually not relevant to whether or not it&#8217;s an experience. If it&#8217;s not relevant, then the distinction between an intuition and an experience doesn&#8217;t make much sense to me either. </p>
<p>So it seems to me like it might be an open question in any case of intuition something very much like perception is occuring (because it&#8217;s open question whether or not there is a causal story like the one I just told is true).</p>
<p>(p.s. You should think about adding  the Subscribe to Comments by email plugin that let&#8217;s users check a box and get notified by email about new comments from a particular post they&#8217;ve commented on)</p>
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		<title>By: Jason</title>
		<link>http://jonathanichikawa.net/weblog/intuition-and-experience/#comment-295</link>
		<dc:creator>Jason</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Feb 2010 16:46:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://jonathanichikawa.net/?p=195#comment-295</guid>
		<description>Not sure if this is relevant, but it seems to me that something similar can be said about they view of an empiricist like Ayer.  He says that my knowledge that squares have four sides is dependent only on my understanding of the words involved ('square', 'four', 'side', etc.).  But here it is also difficult to understand how this knowledge is independent of experience since my understanding the meaning of the relevant terms is derived from experiences of those terms.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Not sure if this is relevant, but it seems to me that something similar can be said about they view of an empiricist like Ayer.  He says that my knowledge that squares have four sides is dependent only on my understanding of the words involved (&#8217;square&#8217;, &#8216;four&#8217;, &#8217;side&#8217;, etc.).  But here it is also difficult to understand how this knowledge is independent of experience since my understanding the meaning of the relevant terms is derived from experiences of those terms.</p>
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